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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
State of Utah 
CALIFORNIA PACKING COR-
PORATION, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. \ 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The California Packing Corporation, the plaintiff 
in this action, which will hereinafter be called the Com-
pany, is a corporation organized and existing under 
and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York. It 
has qualified to do business in the State of Utah, and 
does business in this State. Because of its activities in 
the State of Utah, it is required to file returns and pay 
tax pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 13, of Title 
80, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 as amended. This 
law hereinafter in this brief will be referred to a.s the 
,Franchise Tax Act. The Company filed its Franchise 
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Tax return for the fiscal year commencing March 1, 1935, 
and ending February 29, 1936. The State Tax Com-
mission, hereafter in this brief called the Commission, 
audited the return of the Company and proposed a de-
ficiency in tax. The tax payer objected to the proposed 
deficiency, and requested a hearing for redetermination 
of the deficiency. This hearing was granted, and on 
January 6, 1938, the matter was heard before the Com-
mlsswn. On June 24, 1938, the Commis·sion rendered 
its decision in the matter, and the Company, being dis-
satisfied with the decision, and pursuant to Section 47, 
Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, pe-
titioned this Honorable Court to review the decision of 
the Commission. Under the provisions of the Franchise 
Tax Act, this Court by Certiorari may review the decision 
of the Commission on both the law and the facts. 
Because the Uourt can review both the law and the 
facts in this case, and because the questions involved 
have never been passed upon or touched by this Court 
in any pervious decision, the Plaintiff is going to take 
the liberty of reciting the statutes and the facts very 
fully. We ask the Court's indulgence. 
The California Packing Corporation ts engaged 
primarily in the business of packing and canning fruits, 
vegetables, fish, and in general all canned merchandise, 
and in merchandising its products so processed. The 
products processed by the Company a're commonly 
known under the trade name of "Del Monte Brand". 
3 
The company sells its products in all forty-eight states 
in the Union and in foreign countries. The Company 
owns and operates several canning factories in the 
State of Utah, where it cans fruits and vegetables. The 
products processed in the State of Utah are sold wher-
ever the Company does business. The Company main-
tains no sales office in the State of Utah. All sales of 
its products made in the State of Utah are made by sales-
men sent out from premises for the transaction of bus-
iness owned or rented by the Corporation outside this 
state. It is apparent from the record in this case, that 
the business of this corporation is the normal business 
of processing and selling and that in the conduct of the 
business there is nothing exceptional. 
Corporations which do business in the State of Utah 
and in other states, are required to allocate to the State 
of Utah their net income by using apportionment factors. 
This method of allocation of income is set forth in Sub-
sections 6, 7, and 8 of Section 21 of Franchise Tax Act 
and is as follow<&: 
" ( 6) If the bank or other corporation car-
ries on any business outside this state, the said 
remainder may be divided into three equal parts: 
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be at-
tributed to business carried on within this state 
as shall be found by multiplying said third by a 
fraction whose numerator is the value of the cor-
poration's tangible property situated within this 
state and whose denominator is the value of all 
the corpor~tion ts tangible property wherever 
situated. 
(b) Of another thirdt such portion shall be 
attributed to busine·ss carried on within this 
state as shall be found by multiplying said third 
by a fraction whose numerator is the total amount 
expended by the corporation for wages, salaries, 
commissions or other compensation to its em-
ployees and assignable to this state and whose 
denominator is the total expenditures of the cor-
poration for wages, salaries, commissions or 
other compensation to all of its employees. 
(c) Of the remaining third, such portion 
shall be attributed to busines·s carried on within 
this state as shall be found by multiplying said 
third by a fraction whose numerator is the amount 
of the corporation's gross receipts from business 
assignable to this state, and whose denominator 
is the amount of the corporation's gross recipts 
from all its business. 
(d) The amount assignable to this state of 
expenditures of the corporation for wages, sal-
aries, commissions or other compensation to its 
employees shall be such expenditure for the tax-
able year as represents the compensation of em-
ployees not chiefly situated at, connected with or 
sent out from, premises for the transaction of 
business owned or rented by the corporation out-
side this ·State. 
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross 
receipts from business assignable to this state 
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the 
taxable year from 
(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or 
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents or 
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agenc~es chiefly situated at, connected with or 
sent out from premises for the transaction of 
business owned or rented by the corporation out-
side this state, and sales otherwise determined by 
the tax con1mission to be attributable to the bus-
iness conducted on such premises, 
(2nd) Rentals or royalties from prop-
erty situated, or from the use of patents, within 
this state. 
(f) The value of the corporation's tangible 
property for the purpose of this section shall be 
the average value of -such property during the 
taxable year. 
(7) In the allocation of net income, gain or 
loss shall be recognized and shall be computed on 
the same basis and in the same manner as is pro-
vided in this chapter for the determination of net 
income. 
(8) If in the judgment of the tax commis-
sion the application of the foregoing rules does 
not allocate to this state the proportion of net 
income fairly and equitably attributable to this 
sta.te, it may with such information as it may be 
able to obtain make such allocation as is fairly 
calcttlated to assign to this state the portion .of 
net income reasonably attributable to the busi-
ness done within this state and to avoid subject-
ing the taxpayer to dou.ble taxation. 
(Italics Ours) 
The company in filing its Franchise Tax return, and 
in determining the allocation fraction to assign income 
attributable to business done in the State of Utah, used 
the three factors set out in the Statute: 
6 
In Utah Total Fraction 
1. Tangible Property 
$1,121,7 46.55 $32,672,848.61 .034333 
2. Salaries and Wages 
284,014.19 10,936,056.31 .025970 
3. Sales None 55,511,789.30 .000000 
Total .060303 
Allocation ]'raction ( 1-3 of above) .020101 
It will be observed that the Company in determining 
the apportionment fraction did not allocate to Utah any 
sales as being made by salesmen or agents sent out from 
premises for the transaction, of business owned or rent-
ed by the Corporation inside the State of Utah. This is 
in conformity with the statute. There is no finding 
made by the commission, nor is there any evidence ~n 
the record which would support a finding that the Com-
pany did make sales from premises located in the State 
of Utah. The Tax Comission in its decision ignored 
the definition of sales as set forth in the statute auu al-
located to this State sales of goods which were stored 
in the State of Utah at the time of sale. It is the posi-
tion of the Company that there is no foundation either 
by reason of any statute or evidence that the Comn;is-
sion in its decision was justified in departing from the 
normal manner of determining the sales factor, but that 
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on the contrary the decision of the Commission is en-
tirely arbitrary and unwarranted by reason of both the 
law and the facts in this case. Under Lhe decision of 
the Commission, the allocation fraction is as f::.llows: 
In and 
In Utah Outside Utah Fraction 
1. Total tangible property 
1,121, 7 46.55 32,672,848.61 .034333 
2. 'l'otal wages, etc. 
284,014.19 10,936,056.31 .025970 
3. Total gross receipts 
2,122,110.26 55,511,789.30 .038228 
4. Total 1, 2, & 3 .098531 
----
5. Apportionment fraction-1-3 of 4 .032844 
The amount shown as No. 3, total gross receipts, 
represents sales of goods which were stored in Utah at 
the time the sale was made. The sales of these goods 
could have been consummated in any state in the Union, 
and they could have been consigned to any state in the 
Union. But none of these goods were sold by agents or 
salesmen sent out from premises within the State of 
Utah. The only evidence (if it can be called evidence) 
in this record which would in any way tend to sustain 
the ruling of the Commission is the introduction by tho 
Commission of the franchise tax returns of the Utah 
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Packing Corporation. The Utah Packing Corporation 
before its dissolution, was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the California Packing Corporation. The Utah Packing 
Corporation did no business outside of the State of Utah, 
and was a Utah Corporation. The return of the Calif-
ornia Packing Corporation is in no way connected with 
the prior returns of the Utah Packing Corporation, and 
all that the returns of the Utah Packing Corporation 
show is that they paid a larger franchise tax than the 
California Packing Corporation. There is nothing in 
the evidence to show why the Utah Packing Corporation 
paid a larger tax or why the California Packing Corpora-
tion paid a smaller tax. The two are separate and distinct 
entities, and we submit there is no evidence or no linking 
up of the two returns which in any way make the returns 
of the Utah Packing Corporation relevant or material 
in this action. The Utah Packing Corporation at the 
time the returns in question were filed was out of ex-
istence, there having been a reorganization of the Calif-
ornia Packing Corporation in which its subsidiary com-
panies were dissolved and all of the business conducted 
by the parent corporation, the California Packing Cor-
poration. More will be said relative to this evidence 
in the argument. 
The Tax Commission in its decision reached another 
conclusion which the company deems to be contrary to 
the facts and to the law in this case. As has been said 
before, the California Packing Corporation is a corpora-
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tion organized and existing under and by virtue of the 
laws of the State of New York. Most of its busines-s is 
transacted and its main office is located in San Fran-
cisco, California. The California Packing Corporation 
owns stocks, bonds and other properties from which it 
obtains interest, dividends and rentals. The income of 
the Company by reason of the owner·ship of stocks, bonds 
and other intangibles, for the year in question, received 
outside of the State of Utah, and on the return of the 
Company specifically allocated outside the State of Utah 
amounted to $878,347.32. Section 21 of Chapter 13 
Title 80 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Subsection 1, 
provides as follows: 
''Rents, interest and dividends derived from 
business done outside this state, less related ex-
penses, shall not be allocated to this state." 
The company allocated specifically to the State of 
Utah rents and interest from properties located within 
the state, and specifically allocated outside the state, 
rents, interest and dividends received on property out-
side the state. 
The ~1ax Commission m redetermining the tax of 
the company, included this income, which we shall term 
financial income, in that gross income, and apportioned 
it by using the allocation fraction. This the Company 
deems to be contrary to the law as set forth in the fran-
chise Tax Act, and unconstitutional under the Federal 
Constitution. 
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QUESTIONS OF LAW 
As the plaintiff views this case, the decision of the 
Commission raises the following questions of law: 
1. Can the Commission depart from the use of 
the normal allocation factors to impose a greater tax 
upon the Company. This involves a question of con-
struction of the statutes which have been set forth above. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff that it was the in-
tention of the legislature to limit the Commission in de-
parting from the application of the normal allocation 
factors to those cases where a corporation doing busi-
ness in and out of the State of Utah would be subjected 
to double taxation and an inequitable tax by the applica-
tion of the normal fractions. 
2. 'l_1he next question as we view the case is whether 
or not (if we concede, which we do not, that the Tax Com-
mission has the power to ignore the allocation fraction) 
there are sufficient finding's or is there sufficient evidence 
in this record to justify the Commission in making such 
a finding or in reaching the conclusion which it has reach-
ed. 
3. It is the position of the plaintiff that the Com-
mission by departing from the use of the normal alloca-
tion fraction is subjecting this taxpayer to double taxa-
tion, and that by so doing, the Commission is violating 
the clear mandate of the law and of the 14th amendment 
to the constitution of the United States and Article V of 
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the constitution of Utah by taking the property of this 
plaintiff without due process of law. 
On the question of the inclusion of financial rev-
~nue to net income assignable to business done in this 
state and the apportionment of such income by the use 
of the allocation factors, the plaintiff believes that there 
is raised the following questions of law: 
4. 'rhe Commission by so including financial rev-
enue is violating the clear mandate of the statute. This 
income cannot under the law be attributable to business 
done in the State of Utah. 
5. The inclusion of such financial revenue and the 
subjecting of such income to the allocation factor, sub-
jects this plaintiff to double taxation contrary to the 
mandate of the franchise tax act, and the 14th amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 
V of the Constitution of Utah. 
6. The inclusion of financial revenue which is not 
attributable to business done within this state by using 
an allocation fraction which does not take into consid-
eration intangibles located in and out of the State of 
Utah, is contrary to the 14th amendment of the Federal 
Constitution and Article V of the Constitution of Utah 
by reason of the fact that it takes this taxpayers prop~ 
erty without due process of law. 
ARGUMENT 
History and General Discussion of Utah Franchise 
12 
Tax Act 
The State of Utah prior to the decision of the Su-
preme Court of this state, in the case of Minneapolis 
Steel and Machinery Company vs. Crockett, 263 "P" 
926, imposed a tax upon corporations both foreign and 
domestic, based upon the authorized capital stock of 
such corporations without regard to where such capital 
was employed. This Court in the above cited case, held 
that such a license fee violated the Federal Constitution 
and that such method of taxation could not be employed. 
The basis of the decision was that the State of Utah 
was imposing a license fee or tax upon capital over which 
it had no jurisdiction. 
The then Governor of the State appointed a commis-
sion to study the tax structure of the State. One, of the 
purposes of this commission was to study a proper cor-
poration tax which would be constitutional. The Com-
mission recommended the adoption by the legislature of 
what is commonly called the Massachusetts system. The 
legislature in the main followed the advice of the Tax 
Revision Commission and enacted the present Franchise 
Tax Act. There are material variations between our 
present law and the Massachusetts law, but in theory, 
the two are the same. The difficulty encountered by most 
states in :finding a constitutional tax has been the same 
difficulty which was present under the old Utah law, i.e., 
to allocate to the state only that proportion of income 
or capital employed which is connected with business 
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done in the state. Any method of allocating income 
such as is done under the Utah law must of necessity be 
arbitrary in its nature. Unless there is a showing by 
a particular corporation, that the method which is set 
forth by the legislature in its application to that corpora--
tion, taxes income which is not attributable to business 
done within the state, then such method of allocating i'3 
entirely constitutional. The legislature of the State of 
Utah, to insure the constitutionality of the Franchise 
Tax Act, granted the Tax Commission the power to make 
adjustments in such cases. 
1. Can the Commission depart from the use of the 
normal allocati.on factors to impose a greater tax upon 
the Cmnpany. This involves a question of construction of 
the statutes which have been set out above. It is the 
contention of the plaintiff that it was the intention. of the 
legislature to limit the Commission in departing from the 
application of the normal allocation factors to those 
cases where a oorporation doing business in and out of 
the State of Utah would be subjected to double taxation 
and an inequitable tax by the application of the normal 
fractions. 
With the general history of the Utah law in mind, 
and the difficulties which have been encountered in this 
state and other states in imposing either a tax based 
upon capital employed or upon income, we believe that 
it is proper that at this time we discuss the intent of 
the legislature and what we believe to be the limitations 
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imposed by the legislaure upon the Tax Commission in 
departing from the normal allocation factors. 'rhe Tax 
Commission in this case, departed from the normal al-
location factor relating to sales. Their authority for 
doing so must be granted by the statute. The only pos-
sible authority which the Commission have under the 
statute must be derived from sub-paragraph (e) of sub-
section 6 of Section 21, Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, or subsection 8 of the same sec-
tion and Chapter. This law has been set out fully in 
the statement of facts. Under the first subparagraph 
cited, it will be observed that the legislature granted 
the Tax Commission the power to determine that cer-
tain sales were consummated by agents or agencies sit-
uated at, connected with, or sent out from premises for 
the transaction of business owned or rented by the cor-
poration outside this state. But there is nothing in the 
statute which grants the Tax Commission power to de-
termine that sales made by corporations from premises 
owned or rented by the corporation outside this state, 
were in fact made within this state. The statute very 
clearly says that the commission may attribute certai~ 
sales to business conducted from premises outside the 
state, but nowhere are they given the power to determine 
that sales which were in fact consummated by agents or 
agencies sent out from premises without the state, are 
sales which may be attributable to business done within 
this state. Under subsection 8 of the same section and 
Chapter, the Tax Commission is given further power 
15 
to disregard the nonnal allocation factors, but here 
again the legislature limited the Tax Commission in de-
parting from the use of the factors to only those cases 
which would subject the taxpayer to double taxation and 
to an unconstitutional tax by using the normal allocation 
factors. By a careful reading of the two sections above 
discussed, and when the two are read together, we be-
lieve that it conclusively appears that the intention of 
the legislature was to strictly limit the Tax Commission 
to those cases, where a corporation doing business in 
and out of the State of Utah, would be subjected to more 
than its fair portion of tax by the use of the nonnal 
allocation factors. It must be remembered in this case 
that the Company is not attacking the use of the normal 
allocation factors set forth by the legislature, but is con-
tending that the use of these factors properly reflects 
income attributable to business done within this state. 
The Tax Commission by departing from the use of the 
normal allocation factors, is subjecting this corporation 
to a burden of taxation which is not contemplated in the 
statutes. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
consistently held that a state may not tax income which 
is not attributable to business done within that state. 
This Court citea these cases and recognized this prin-
ciple in the case of Minneapolis Steel and Machinery 
Company vs. Crockett, supra. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has also recognized the principle that 
a state may tax income attributable to business done 
within that state. Perhaps the leading case on this 
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question is the case of Underwood Typewriter Company 
vs. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 65 L. Ed. 165, 41 S. Ct. 
45. In this case, the State of Connecticut taxed corpora-
tions doing business in and out of the State by apportion-
ing income attributable to business done within the state 
by using only the tangible property factor, which is 
found in the Utah law. The Supreme Court of the United 
States, through Justice Brandies, in upholding the Con-
necticut law, said the following: 
'The legislature, in attempting to put upon 
this business its fair share of the burden of tax-
ation, was faced with the impossibility of allocat-
ing specifically the profits earned by the processes 
conducted within its borders. It therefore adopt-
ed a method of apportionment which, for all that 
appears in this record, reached, and was meant 
to reach, only the profits earned within the state. 
"The plaintiff's argument on this branch of the 
case", as stated by the supreme court of errors, 
"carries the burden of showing that 47 per cent 
of its net income is not reasonably attributable, 
for purposes of taxation, to the manufacture of 
products from the sale of which 80 per cent of 
its gross earnings was derived after paying man-
ufacturing costs, "94 Conn 47, 108 Atlantic 159. 
The corporation has not even attempted to show 
this; and, for aught that appears, the percentage 
of net profits earned in Connecticut may have 
been much larger than 47 per cent. There is, con-
sequently, nothing in this record to show that the 
method of apportionment adopted by the state 
was inherently arbitrary, or that its application 
to this corporation produced an unreasonable 
result. 
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"We have no occasion to consider whether 
the rule prescribed, if applied under different 
conditions, might be obnoxious to the Constitu-
tion. Adams Exp. Co. vs. Ohio State Auditor, 
166 U. S. 185, 222, 41 L. Ed. 965, 978, 17 S. Ct. 
Rep. 604. Nor need we consider the contention 
made on behalf of the State, that the statute is 
neces-sarily valid, because the prescribed rule of 
apportionment is not rigid, and provision is made 
for rectifying, by proceedings in the superior 
court, any injustice resulting from its applica-
tion.'' 
The reasoning applied to the facts in the above case 
by Justice BrandieS', does not hold valid all taxes based 
upon income where an apportionment factor such as 
the one used in Connecticut is applied. The holding in 
this case is that such an apportionment factor is not 
inherently arbitrary. The corporation in the cited case 
did not introduce evidence to show that the use of the 
apportionment factor allocated too much income to the 
State of Connecticut. In the cited portion of the decision, 
Justice Brandies also calls attention to the fact that the 
statute is not inflexible, in other words, the tax officials 
of the State of Connecticut, if the corporation could 
have shown that it was paying a tax on income which 
was not attributable to business done in the State of 
Connecticut, could have made adjustments. In the case 
of Hans Rees Sons, Inc., vs. State of North Carolina 
on the relation of Allen J. Maxwell 75 L. Ed. 879, 283 
U. S. 123, the State of North Carolina imposed a fran-
chise tax based upon income, using the same apportion-
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ment factor which was used in the Connecticut statute. 
In this case, the Company by evidence proved that the 
use of the apportionment factor allocated income to the 
State of North Carolina was out of proportion with the 
business done in that state. The Supreme Court of the 
United States held that the tax as applied to the corpora-
tion was unconstitutional. Again we find in the case of 
Gorham Mfg. Co. vs. Travis, 274 Fed. 975, affirmed in 
19·24 in 266 U. S. 265, 69 L. Ed. 279, 45 S. Ct. 80, that the 
State of New York imposes a franchise tax based upon 
income using the tangible property factor, and where 
the taxpayer was given a right to a hearing to determine 
whether or not the apportionment factor used properly 
reflected income attributable to business done in that 
state, the court held that the statute was not inherently 
unconstitutional, but that the use of the apportionment 
factor did not properly reflect the income of the corpora-
tion attributable to business done in the State of New 
York. 
'Ve cite these cases at this time because the eases, 
with the exception of the Hans Rees Sons, Inc., vs. North 
Carolina, supra, were decided prior to the enactment of 
the Utah law. It is our position that the Tax Revision 
Commission appointed by the Governor of the State of 
Utah and the legislature, were cognizant of these eases 
at the time our law was passed, and that the purpose in 
allowing the Tax Commission in certain cases to disre-
gard the use of the normal allocation fractions, was to 
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safeguard the Utah law from being declared unconstitu· 
tional as being arbitrary where the facts show that the 
use of the normal allocation fractions did not as to them 
properly reflect the business done by corporations doing 
business in and out of the State of Utah. 
See also the following cases: 
Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton vs. State Tax Com-
mission (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 69 L. Ed. 
282. 
Singer Mfg. Co. vs. Gilpatric (1922) 98 Conn. 
192, 118 Atl. 919. 
Internationall1Jlevator Company vs. Thoresen 
(1929) 58 N.D. 776, 228 N.W. 192. 
A case which we deem to be in point is that of Peo-
ple ex. rel. Studebaker Corporation of America vs. Gil-
christ, ct. al., State 'l'ax Commission, 155 N. E. 68, 244 
N. Y. 144. In this case, the Studebaker Corporation of 
America was a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of New York. All of the capital stock of 
the Studebaker Corporation of America was owned by 
the Studebaker Corporation, a corporation not organized 
under the laws of the state of New York. The Stude-
baker Corportion of America sold automobiles and parts 
manufactured by the parent corporation, such sales be-
ing made in the State of New York. The contract of the 
subsidiary with the parent was such that the sales com-
pany could not make a profit, all of the profits being made 
by thC' parent corporation which did no business in the 
State of New York. The State of New York imposed a 
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franchise tax based upon income. The Tax Commis-
sion of New York attempted to adjust the tax to reflect 
the proper income of the sales company by apportioning 
part of the profit of the parent to business done in the 
State of New York. New York had no statute which 
allowed the Tax Commission to demand a consolidated 
return from the corporation. In discussing the action 
of the Tax Commission in attempting to allocate a por-
tion of the income to New York, Mr. Justice Cardoza, the 
then Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals in New York, 
said the following: 
'' 'l'he taxing officers of the state are mere 
adminsirative agents. They may not devise new 
forms and methods of taxation, however conven-
ient or useful. 'l'hey have no more inherent pow-
er to tax a corporation upon the income of its 
stockholder where the stockholder is another cor-
poration than they have where the stockholder is 
a natural person. 'rhey do not help themselves 
by saying that the stockholder is a natural person. 
They do not help themselves by saying that the 
stockholder in the long run may be expected to 
pay the bill, so that little harm will be done, what-
ever the method of assessment. As·sessment, how-
ever handy, must find its warrant in the statute. 
A statute leveying a tax will not be extended by 
implication beyond the clear import of its terms. 
Gould vs. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 S. Ct. 53, 
62 L. Ed. 211. If one method of assessment or 
collection is pointed out, the courts will not per-
mit the application of another on the theory that 
the Legislature might just as well have chosen it, 
since in the final devolution of the burden the 
result will be the same or, at worst, not widely 
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different. U. S. vs. Field 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct. 
256, 65 L. Ed. 617, 18 A.L.R. 1461; Stebbins vs. 
Kay 123 N. Y. 31, 25 N. E. 207; People ex. rel. 
Mutual Trust Company vs. Miller, 177 N. Y. 51, 
69, N. E. 124. We take the statute as we find it. 
One who serves as a conduit for a payment to 
someone else may not be taxed upon that payment 
as if he had kept it for himself." 
It is the contention of this plaintiff that the Tax 
Commission of this state is attempting to do what the Tax 
Commission of New York in the cited case attempted to 
do, i.e., change the law without authority under the law, 
to apportion to this state the income which the Tax Com-
mission would like to have apportioned to the state. We 
submit that the legislature in enacting the Utah Fran-
chise Tax limited the Tax Commission in departing from 
the normal allocation fraction to only those cases where 
the application of the normal fraction would render the 
assessment of the tax unconstitutional as to that com-
pany. 
The courts have recognized the rule that the legis-
lature must set forth the rules for allocating income at-
tributable to business done within any state. This is 
not a matter that can be left to the discretion of the ad-
ministrative body. In the case of Puerto Rico Mere. vs. 
Gallardo (1925) 6 F. (2d) 526, the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit, declared that a statute of 
Puerto Rico which made no provision by which the pro-
portion of income attributable to business done in Puerto 
Rico could be ascertained, and that in the absence of stat-
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utory provision as to how the share of income fairly and 
reasonably attributable to business done in Puerto Rico 
could not be made workable, the tax could not be upheld. 
In the case of Western Union Telegraph Company vs. 
Query (1927) 144 S. C. 244, 142 S. E. 509, the Court held 
that a statute that required a taxpayer to allocate income 
to the state in its return to the Tax Commission, and that 
in the event of the failure of the taxpayer to allocate 
such income, the Tax Commission was required to make 
such allocation under rules and regulations promulgated 
by the Commission, that such a statute was unconstitu-
tional. The same rule was laid down in the case of Com-
mission vs. P. Lorillard Company (1921) 129 Va. 74, 105 
S. E. 683. If these laws were held to be an improper 
delegation of power by the legislature to the administra-
tive bodies without any showing that the formula as 
used by the administrative bodies was unreasonable or 
arbitrary, certainly a departure from an allocation fac-
tor which has been laid down by the legislature and is 
manufactured out of the whole cloth by the administra-
tive body, is unconstitutional even though the legislature 
had intended that the Tax Commission have this power. 
The 'l'ax Commission, if its decision in this case is up-
held by this Court, could place a different construction 
on what constituted a sale attributable to business done 
within this state on every merchandising corporation 
doing business within and without this State, according 
to the fancy of the Commission. 
23 
2. The next question as we view the case is whether 
or not (if we ooncede, which we do not, that the Tax) 
Commission has the power to ignore the allocatio~ frac-
tion) there are sufficient findings or is there sufficient 
evidence t:n this record to justify the Commission in mak-
ing such a finding or in reaching the conclusion which 
it has reached. 
The decision of thl~ 'l'ax Commission in the case be-
fore the court does not set forth any findings of fact, 
but is merely a decision of conclusions. An examination 
of the record which has been certified to this court will 
not reveal one iota of evidence which would justify the 
Tax Commission in determining that the normal alloca-
tion fraction does not apply. It is the position of this 
plaintiff that this case is the converse to the Underwood 
Typewriter Company vs. Chamberlain, supra; the Hans 
Rees Sons, Inc., vs. State of North Carolina, supra; and 
Gorham Mfg. Company vs. Travis, supra. We say this 
because in the three cited cases the corporations were 
attacking the normal statutory method of allocating in-
come. In this case the plaintiff contends that the normal 
statutory method properly allocates income and the Tax 
Commission is the one who is attempting to disprove 
that the statutory method is not proper. It is our con-
tention that the burden was on the Tax Commission to 
prove that the plaintiff Company in the exercise of its 
franchise, conducted its business in a manner which pre-
cluded it from apportioning its income to business done 
in the State of Utah in the normal manner. We have 
outlined very fully in our statement of facts the method 
in which the California Packing Corporation conducts 
its business and we can find nothing which would justify 
a conclusion that it operated its business any differently 
than any other manufacturing and merchandising com-
pany. A case which we deem to be directly in point rela-
tive to the burden of proof, is Curtis Companies, et. 
al., vs. Wisconsin Tax Commission, decided December 
5, 1933, 251 N. W. 497. In this case, the Wisconsin 'l'ax 
Commission had the power to require consolidated re-
turns where a wholly owned subsidiary filed under the 
Wisconsin act and the commission did not deem that 
the return of the subsidiary corporation reflected true 
income. This case is a good deal the same as the Stude-
baker Corporation of America vs. Gilchrist, supra, ex-
cept that in this case the Wisconsin law gave the power 
to the Commission to require a consolidated return be-
tween the parent and the subsidiary. A consolidated 
return was filed and additional tax was assessed by the 
Wisconsin Commission. A review of the assessment was 
asked by the Company and the case decided by the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin. The action of the Commis-
sion was reversed for the reason that the Commission 
made no finding or was there any evidence in the record 
that the contract between the parent and the subsidiary 
was unreasonable. The Court held that in the absence 
of any evidence showing an intent to evade the tax, the 
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Commission was not justified m demanding a consoli-
dated return. 
The plaintiff in this case makes the same contention 
that where there is no evidence or no findings that the 
conduct of the business of the company is in any way ex-
ceptional or that the business is conducted in such a way 
that the use of the normal allocation factors does not 
apply, that the decision based upon mere conclusions of 
the Tax Commission is wholly void and contrary to law. 
Upon this point, we believe that the language of Mr. 
Justice Cardoza in the case of Studebaker Corporation 
of America, vs. Gilchrist, supra, is also applicable. 
As was stated in our statement of facts, the Com-
mission have certified, as part of the record in this case, 
to the Supreme Court, the returns filed by the Utah Pack-
ing Corporation. We can anticipate that the Commis-
sion will make some contention that these returns are in 
some way applicable to the case now before the Court. 
We believe that we can anticipate the arguments which 
will be made and the use to which the Commission will 
try to put the inclusion of the returns of the Utah Pack-
ing Corporation. For that reason, we are going to give 
the Court our views as to why these returns are not 
competent evidence, and will assist the Court in no way 
in deciding this case. It was set out in our statement 
of facts that the Utah Packing Corporation did business 
only in the State of Utah. The books and records of the 
Utah Packing Corporation at the time it filed returns 
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with the State Tax Commission, were kept separately 
from those of the parent, the California Packing Corpor-
ation. 'l'he gross income of the Utah Packing Corpora-
tion was the amount of money paid by the California 
Packing Corporation to the Utah Packing Corporation 
for the products which it manufactured. We anticipate 
that it will be the contention of the Commission that the 
returns of the Utah Packing Corporation would reflect 
the income of the business done by the California Pack-
ing Corporation in the State of Utah, if the California 
Packing Corporation filed its returns on a separate ac-
counting basis which showed only profit d~.rived from the 
Utah operations of the California Packing Corporation. 
We submit that any such argument is so far-fetched 
and is so subject to variables, that the returns of the 
Utah Packing Corporation are absolutely worthless to 
sustain any such contention. The conditions of the mar-
ket at the time the Utah Packing Corporation filed its 
returns may have been wholly different than the condi-
tion of the market at the time the return here undet 
question was filed. There is no evidence in the record 
as to what market conditions were at the time the Utah 
Packing Corporation filed its returns or what market 
conditions were at the time the California Packing Cor-
poration filed its return. The condition of the market 
may have made the difference between profit and loss 
of Utah operations. At the time of the hearing, the 
Commission requested that the California Packing Cor-
poration file a return, if it could do so, on a separate 
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accounting basis. Because all of the subsidiaries of the 
California Packing Corporation had been consolidated 
and their accounting system was such that they could 
not segregate the Utah operations from the other opera-
tions of the corporation, it was impossible to file the 
return on a separate accounting basis showing Utah 
operations. 'l'he Supreme Court of the United States 
in the cases which have been heretofore cited have rec-
ognized that large corporations operate as a unit and 
that their operations cannot be broken down to cover 
profits earned from any one state or district. This is 
true with the California Packing Corporation. The 
entire operation is a consolidated and unitary one. It 
might very well be that the California Packing Corpor-
ation in its operation for the year here in question lost 
money on its Utah operations but made money, for ex-
ample, on its Florida grapefruit canning operations. 
There is no way of determining just where the profits 
were made. If it is true that their profits were made 
from operations outside of the State of Utah, and this 
is entirely probable and possible, then the State of Utah 
is deriving profits from business done outside of the 
state. It is our position that by the unitary method of 
operation the amount of tax paid by this corporation 
will equalize in the years when the Utah crop and pack 
is unprofitable the State of Utah will have the advantage 
of packs in other states which are profitable, and so in 
years when the Utah crop and pack is good and that in 
other states is bad, it might be that some profit will be 
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lost to this state. We believe that this amply illustrates 
the utter futility to this court, in considering the returns 
of the Utah Packing Corporation as having any bearing 
whatsoever on this case. ]-,or all that appears from thi.; 
record, the canneries located in this state may not even 
have operated in the State of Utah in the year under con-
sideration and still, the California Packing Corporation 
made a profit as a unit, and Utah received its portion of 
that profit. We submit to the Court that the returns 
filed by the Utah Packing Corporation in prior years 
have no bearing, weight, or relevancy to the issues in-
volved in this case, and that such returns should be 
ignored by the Court. 
3. It is the position of the plaintiff that the Com-
mission by departing from the use of the normal alloca-
tion fraction is subjecting this taxpayer to double taxa-
tion, and that by s,o doing, the Commission is violating 
the clear mandate of the law and of the 14th Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States by taking the 
property of this plaintiff without due process of law. 
Subsection 8 of Section 21, Chapter 13 of Title 80, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, specifically directs the 
Tax Commission to allocate income on business done 
within the State of Utah in such a manner as to avoid 
double taxation. It is the contention of this plaintiff 
that the Tax Commission have flown directly in the face 
of this direction in the decision in this case. The deci-
sion of the Tax Commission, instead of tending to avoid 
a double taxation on the income of this corporation, have 
made it more possible that the same income will be 
taxed, in different jurisdictions. To illustrate our point, 
if the State of California, (which has a franchise tax 
very similar to ours), construed sales as being made 
within the state where they are made by agents or 
agencies working from offices or premises located in the 
State of California, then the sales made by the Cali-
fornia Packing Corporation of its merchandise which 
was stored in Utah at the time of the sale, such sales 
would be taken into consideration in determining the 
allocation factor for allocating income attributable to 
business done in the State of California. The State Tax 
Commission by determining that such sales were made 
in the State of Utah is subjecting the same income to 
tax as being attributable to business done within the 
State of Utah. If this were true of all states in which 
the California Packing Corporation does business, then 
the same income could be subject to three or four taxes. 
But if the State Tax Commission adopted the normal 
allocation factors and the statutory definition of sales, 
then the same income of this corporation would not be 
subject to a double tax. We cannot see by what stretch 
of the imagination the Tax Commission can determine 
that a sale is attributable to business done in the State 
of Utah, merely because the goods which are sold are 
located in the State at the time of sale. It might be, 
under the theory of the Tax Commission, that the Cali-
fornia Packing Corporation would ship a car of Florida 
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grapefruit to the State of Utah and warehouse it, and 
later, by salesmen located in the State of Idaho, sell 
all of the grapefruit in the State of Idaho. Certainly 
the transaction could not be said to be attributable to 
business done within the state of Utah merely because 
the corporation had used a Utah warehouse. Under the 
decision of the Commission, that sale of goods in Idaho 
would be determined to have been consummated in the 
State of Utah and a tax upon the income, paid to the 
State of Utah. Idaho could also determine that the 
sales were consummated in that state. We believe that 
any such ruling is so arbitrary and unreasonable on its 
face that this court cannot reach any other conclusion 
but that the administrative legislation by the State Tax 
Commission is not warranted by the statutes of the State 
and is on its face an unconstitutional taking of the prop-
erty of this plaintiff without due process of law. See 
the cases of Carlos Ruggles Lumber Company, vs. Com-
missioner (1927) 261 Mass. 445. 158 N. E. 899, Arpin vs. 
Eberhardt (1914) 158 Wis. 20, 147 N. E. 1016. The 
Crescent Mfg. Company vs. South Carolina Tax Commis-
sion, 129 S. C. 480, 124 S. E. 761. We also wish to call 
the Court's attention to the cases which have been cited 
heretofore in this brief. The Courts in the cited cases 
have uniformly held that a state may only tax that in-
come which is derived from business done within the 
state. Merely because the property is stored in the 
State of Utah prior to sale does not make such a sale 
attributable to business done within the State of Utah. 
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We submit that the application of the statute by the Tax 
Commission in its decision is unconstitutional as taxing 
income which can in no way be attributable to business 
done within this state. We appreciate, as we have said 
before, the use of allocation fractions in measuring bus-
iness done within any state is inherently arbitrary, but 
for an administrative agency to promulgate decisions 
which are even more arbitrary than the statute itself, is 
on its face unconstitutional. The State Tax Commission 
has substituted its definition of a sale, for the definition 
of the legislature, without any delegation of power by 
the legislature to the Tax Commission. It is just a case 
of an administrative body making an arbitrary formula 
worse. We submit that as to this corporation the de-
cision of the State Tax Commission in disregarding the 
normal allocation fractions and setting up one of its 
own, is unconstitutional and is depriving this company 
of its property without due process of law. The de-
cision of the Commission should be rectified by this 
Court. 
4. The C ommissi,on by so including financial rev-
enue is violating the clear mandate of the statute. This 
income cannot under the law be attributable to business 
done in the State of Utah. 
Subsection 1 of Section 21 of Chapter 13, Title 80, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, which has been quoted, 
and subsection 3 of the same section which provided as 
follows: 
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'' Rent·s, interest and dividents derived from 
business done in this state, less related expenses, 
shall be allocated to this state." 
It is the Company's interpretation of the law that where 
rents, interest, and dividends are derived from business 
done in this state than the full amount of such income 
received in this manner shall be allocated to the State in 
full and under no interpretation of the statute shall such 
income be allocated by the use of apportionment factors. 
The State Tax Commission in its decision, have determ-
ined that the interest and dividends herein received by 
the company, were not received in connection with busi-
ness done at any particular place but were received in 
the conduct of the general business of the company. It 
is our position that intangibles and also the income 
from intangibles must have a situs at some particular 
place, either the domicile of the owner or they must 
acquire a business situs for the purpose of taxation. 
See also the following cases: 
Shaffer vs. Carter 252 U.S. 37, 64 L. Ed. 445. 
Travis vs. Yale and T. Mfg. Co. 252 U.S. 60, 
64 L. Ed. 460. 
Meyer, Auditor of Oklahoma vs. ·wells Fargo 
and Co., 223 U. S. 298, 56 L. Ed. 445. 
The intangibles from which interest and dividends were 
received, had neither a situs in the State of Utah by 
reason of domicile, this company being a New York cor-
poration, nor had they acquired a business situs. The 
business situs of the intangibles was at the main place 
of business in San Francisco. There is no finding made 
by the Commission that any of the intangibles were 
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located in the State of Utah. The statute says that in-
come derived "from business done outside this state 
shall not be allocated to this state". Surely there is no 
evidence in this record that this income was received 
from business done within this state. The question as 
to the situs of intangibles for purposes of taxation, has 
arisen a great number of times in inheritance tax cases. 
The rule first adopted by the Supreme Court of the 
United States was that intangibles have a situs for tax 
purposes at the domicile of the owner. Blodgett vs. 
Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410; Farmers Loan and 
Trust Company vs. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 
Rep. 98; Baldwin vs. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 
Rep. 436; Beidler vs. South Carolina Tax Commission, 
282 U. S. 1, 51 S. Ct. Rep. 54. The Supreme Court of 
the United States susequent to the decisions in the above 
cited cases has to some extent modified the rule and 
has held that intangibles can acquire a business situs 
in a state other than where the owner is domiciled. 
See the case of Wheeling Steel vs. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 
80 L. Ed. 1143. In this case, the Steel Company was 
incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, 
and its principal place of business was located at Wheel-
ing, vVest Virginia. The State of West Virginia imposed 
a tax on the intangibles in accordance with their law. 
The company contended that the situs of the intangibles 
for the purpose of taxation was at the domicile of the 
owner, which was the State of Delaware. The Supreme 
Court of the United States held that because the Com-
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vany held the intangibles in its main office in West Vir-
ginia, and dividends and interest were received in West 
Virginia, that the intangibles had acquired a situs for 
tax purposes in the State of West Virginia and were 
properly taxed in that state. In the case now before 
the Court, the intangibles under consideration have 
never been in the State of Utah, dividends and interest 
are received at a place outside the State of Utah, and 
the domicile of the corporation is located in the State of 
New York. The receipt of the income from these intang-
ibles cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be 
deemed to be attributable to any business done within 
this state. The statute has specifically set forth the 
manner in which such income must be allocated. Cer-
tainly the holding and the receipt of interest and divi-
dends from the intangibles in a place outside of this 
state cannot be construed to be attributable to business 
done within this state. The case of Stanley Works vs. 
Hackett Conn., decided March 4, 1937, 190 At. 743, is a 
case which construes the meaning of the phrase ''from 
business done". The corporation in this case was or-
ganized under the laws of Connecticut. It owned the 
stock of three Canadian corporations from which it 
received dividends. The provision of the Connecticut 
Statute relative to dividends, interest and rentals is as 
follows: 
"Interest, dividends, royalties and gains 
from sales of intangible assets, less related ex-
penses, when received by a company having its 
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principal place of business within the state, shall 
be allocated to the state and, when received by a 
company having its principal place of business 
without the state shall be allocated without the 
state; provided, when it can be clearly establish-
ed that such income is received in connection with 
business within the state, such income shall be 
allocated to the state without regard to the loca-
tion of the principal place of business of the tax-
payer, and a similar rule shall apply to such in-
come received in connection with business without 
the state." 
Sec. 420 c (1) Chapter 66 b Cumulative Sup-
plement of the General Statutes of Connecticut, 
1935. 
This case is interesting because of the construction 
which the Connecticut Court put on the phrase "in con-
nection with business". The Court held that all of the 
dividends were earned upon business done in the Do-
mimon of Canada and should be allocated outside the 
state. 
Under the provisions of the Utah Statute, this in-
come must be allocated wholly within the State of Utah 
or without the State of Utah. The Company in its re-
turn has conceded that certain rents were derived from 
property located within the State of Utah, and in its 
return allocated the whole of the income to business done 
in the State of Utah and has not attempted to have this 
income allocated by use of the apportionment factor. 
We submit that this method of reporting is in absolute 
conformity with the statute and that the interest, divi-
dends and rents reported as received from business done 
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without the State of Utah were by the taxpayer proper-
ly excluded as having any bearing on business done in 
this state, by the taxpayer. The State Tax Commission 
in its decision has again wholly ignored the clear man-
date of the statute and has legislated a method of appor-
tionment entirely of its own which can be justified neither 
by the statute nor by the law. 
5. The inclusion of such financial revenue and the 
subjecting of such incorne to the allocation fact.or, sub-
jects this plaintiff' to double taxation contrary to the 
rnandate of the Franchise Tax Act, and the 14th Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States. 
The whole legislative intent in enacting the fran-
chise tax law as we have heretofore stated, has been an 
attempt to eliminate all possible double taxation of in-
come. Again the commission by its decision has foster-
ed, rather than eliminated, the possibility of double tax-
ation, for example the California law relative to the 
specific allocation of financial revenue, is similar to the 
Utah law. If the business situs theory, for the taxation 
of intangibles or the income from intangibles is adopted 
then the full amount of the financial revenue (except 
that portion which the company concedes was attribut-
able to business done in the State of Utah) would be 
specifically allocated to the State of California. Such 
income would not be subject to any apportionment factor. 
The State of California would receive a tax upon the 
full amount of the income and the State of Utah would 
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attempt to tax a portion of it. And so, if the taxable 
situs of the income was the domicile of the corporation, 
then the State of New York would tax the full amount 
of the income and the State of Utah would tax a portion 
of it. ~rhe method devised by the State Tax Commission 
may be a fair and equitable method and it might be 
proper if it were adopted by all states, but it is not pro-
vided for by the statutes of this State nor of any other 
state which we know. We wish to call the Court's 
attention to the language of the Supreme Court of the 
United States relative to double taxation of intangibles 
in the cases of Blodgett vs. Silberman, supra; Farmers 
Loan and Trust Company vs. Minnesota, supra; Bald-
win vs. Missouri, supra; Beidler vs. South Carolina Tax 
Commission, supra; and also in the case of First Na-
tional Bank of Boston vs. Main, 284 U. S. 312·, 52 S. Ct. 
Rep. 174. We submit that the attempt of the Tax Com-
mission to tax this income as being attributable to bus-
iness done in the State of Utah is wholly arbitrary and 
unconstitutional for the reason that it deprives this tax-
payer of its property without due process of law. 
6. The inclusion of financial revenue which is not 
attributable to business done within this state by using 
an allocation fraction which does not take into consider-
ation intangibles located in and out of the State of Utah, 
is contrary to the 14th Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution by reason of the fact that it takes this taxpayers 
property without due process o/law. 
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In detennining the allocation factors, the Court will 
observe that the only things taken into consideration for 
determining the amount of income to be apportioned to 
the State of Utah is tangible property in and out of the 
State of Utah, salaries and wages paid in and out of 
the State of Utah, and sales assignable to business done 
in and out of the State of Utah. In no place in the stat-
ute for the apportionment of income are intangibles from 
which the Company receives rents, interest and divi-
dends, or as we have tenned it, financial revenue, taken 
into consideration. The case which we deem to be di-
recly in point in the case of People ex. rel. Alpha Port-
land Cement Company vs. Knapp et. al., State Tax Com-
mission, is a New York case decided November 23, 1920, 
230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202, Certiorari denied by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 256 U. S. 702, 41 
S. Ct. Rep. 624. 
'l'he corporation was organized under the laws of 
New Jersey and was doing business in the State of New 
York. A corporation which was doing business in and 
out of the State of New York was by statute required 
to allocate its income by using the following al-
location factors: The real property and the tan-
gible personal property in New York are to be 
compared with the like property in New York and 
elsewhere. 'rhe bills and accounts resulting from man-
ufacturing, sales and services in New York, are to be 
compared with the like bills and accounts in New York 
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and elsewhere. The shares of stock in other corpora-
tions, if found to have a situs in New York, but not ex-
ceeding 10 per cent of the value of the local realty and 
the local tangible personalty, are to be compared with · 
the total shares in other corporations, but not exceeding 
10 per cent of all realty and all the tangible personalty. 
The Statute made no provision for interest paid on 
bonds and a foreign corporation paid a tax on income 
which included interest on bonds. The value of the bonds 
in no way entered into the determination of the alloca-
tion fraction. 
Cardoza Justice 
"I think, therefore, that in substance, though 
not in form, in tendency, though not in name, 
this tax is equivalent to a tax upon relator's in-
come. The only question, then, is whether the 
method of allocation is reasonably adapted to the 
apportionment of ineome according to the situs 
of its origin. 'rhe State substantially concedes 
that a tax on income could not stand if allocated 
on such a basis. Meyer, Auditor of Oklahoma vs. 
Wells Fargo and Company 223 U.S. 298, 32 S. Ct. 
218, 56 L. Ed. 445; Shaffer vs. Carter, 252 U. S. 
37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed 445 ; and Travis vs. 
Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company 252 
U. S. 60, 40 S. Ct. 228, 64 L. Ed. 460, are sufficient 
in themselves to justify the concession." 
"In the first case the tax was measured by 
the entire income. The scheme of allocation lim-
ited the assessors to the comparison of the re-
ceipts of business done within the state with the 
receipts of business there and elsewhere. In-
vestments in bonds and lands were disregarded 
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in the apportionment, though the income from 
such investments was included in the measure. 
On that ground, as well as on others, the statute 
was held invalid. There is no distinction between 
that case and this (so far as the objection just 
stated is concerned), except in the label of the 
burden. Here, a·s there, the statute prescribes a 
rule of allocation which as applied to foreign cor-
porations holding bonds and shares in other 
states, involves an artificial and arbitrary aug-
mentation of the value of the local privilege. It 
measures the value of the franchise, here and 
elsewhere, by income from all sources, and ex-
cludes some of the same sources when the value 
is apportioned, to take from assets elsewhere is 
equivalent to adding to assets here. The statute 
would be little different in principle if it announc-
ed the arbitrary rule that all investments in bonds 
and stocks should be conclusively presumed to 
have their situs in New York. The resulting vice 
in the proportion is not the consequence of ad-
ventitious circumstances of inequalities develop-
ing unexpectedly in the practical workings of the 
statute, but hardly to be avoided by reasonable 
foresight. The exclusion of bonds and stocks is 
the result of an explicit mandate. The principle 
of allocation is not followed to its natural and 
obvious outcome in accordance with the situs of 
the assets, but is consciously checked, its normal 
course is thwarted, by an artificial and designed 
exception. Something which, in the absence of 
express exclusion, would be within its operation, 
is knowingly taken out of it. I am unable to 
avoid the conclusion that a method of apportion-
ment which purposely ignores realties, which 
compels an asses·sor to look to some of the assets 
only, and close his eyes to all others, is arbitrary 
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and unreasonable in its increase of the local 
burden.'' 
The holding in this case clearly renders the attempt-
ed method of apportioning income derived from intang-
ibles unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution, by reason of the fact that it takes 
this taxpayers property without due process of law. 
SUMMARY 
The questions of law which we have deemed to be 
involved in this case are somewhat interlocking. We 
have tried to make this division of our points in such 
a manner as to clarify the issues. We may or may not 
have succeeded in doing this. Practically all of the 
cases cited under the first three points discussed, have 
a definite bearing on the last three points discussed. 
·we have not cited these cases again for the reason that 
we believe the Court in reading the cited cases will rec-
ognize this fact. It is our position hat the Commission 
by its interpretation of the statutes of the State of 
Utah, relative to the allocation and apportionment of in-
come to business done in the State of Utah, and placed 
upon those statutes an unconstitutional interpretation. 
The rule of law that where there are two possible con-
structions of a statute, the Court must adopt that con-
struction which will render the statute constitutional, is 
so elementary, that we do not believe that it necessitates 
the citing of any cases. The plaintiff does not contend 
that the statutes are unconstitutional, but it does con-
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tend that the interpretation and construction placed upon 
the statutes by the Tax Commission in its decision in this 
case, if such interpretation and construction is correct, 
is unconstitutional. We earnestly submit that this cor-
poration in filing its franchise tax return followed the 
clear mandate, intent and spirit of the statutes. There is 
no evidence that the use of the normal method of allo-
cation of income does not properly reflect the income of 
this corporation attributable to business done in the 
State of Utah. The method adopted by the Commis-
sion in allocating financial revenue, is not justified by the 
statutes, the law, and is contrary and in violation to the 
Constitution of this State and of the United States. 
We ask this Court to set aside the deficiency as proposed 
by the State Tax Commission and to direct the State Tu 
Commission to accept the return of this taxpayer as it 
was filed, and to accept as payment in full, the taxes 
which were paid by the taxpayer upon the filing of the 
return. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEVINE, HOWELL & STINE 
NED WARNOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
